At an upcoming conference, someone might well explain the brain and cognition, thereby answering what one irritated scientist once cited as the question no one has answered, ''what does '/' mean in mind/brain? '' (Schwartz, 1993) . That explanation will be interesting only to the degree that it is sufficiently abstract to explain mental function. In the next millennium, a reasonable question to ask of our work would be: Is our empirical understanding abstract enough to frame the capacities of the brain? To explain what one means by sufficient abstractedness, I will look to examples from visual research, an area which has seen epochal advances in this past millennium.
Crick and Koch (1995) have argued that the problem of visual awareness is approachable if one adopts a reductionist view with two major assumptions: first, that somewhere in the cortex, groups of similar neurons fire in a way that correlates with a visual scene (the primary visual cortex is one such place) and second, that these neurons should connect directly, by way of axonal connections, to places that process data. The processing may involve facial recognition, the decision to move a body part, an emotional response, or any number of other functions that are traditionally associated with areas of the brain other than the primary visual cortex. Crick and Koch find the frontal and prefrontal lobes attractive as termini for visual neurons: ''. . . unless a visual area has a direct projection to at least one [of the frontal areas], the activities in that particular visual area will not enter visual awareness directly, because the activity of frontal areas is needed to allow a person to report consciousness.'' They marshal evidence in the macaque monkey at least, and very likely in higher primates as well, that the primary visual cortex has no known connections with frontal structures or even to important subcortical locales
